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v. : 
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Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) , whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree or capital felony. See also Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2) (a) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are 
contained in the text of this brief or in Addendum A: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-509.9 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the court err in not granting the motion for a new 
trial (or did the case at bar fulfill the requirements for a new 
trial)? (Issue preserved at R 84-85; 103-06; 461-68.) 
Standard of Review: 
"Where disinterested testimony on the vital 
point in a case is very scant, newly discovered 
testimony on that point appearing from 
affidavits in support of the motion for a new 
trial to be apparently reliable, . . . and it 
appears likely that such evidence would change 
the result, a new trial should be granted. 
While the granting or refusing of the motion 
lies in the sound discretion of the court, where 
there is a grave suspicion that justice may have 
miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment 
on a vital point which new evidence will 
apparently supply, and the other elements 
attendant on obtaining a new trial on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence are present, it 
would be an abuse of sound discretion not to 
grant the same." 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 800 n.41 (Utah 1988) (citations 
omitted). 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION 
State v. James addresses the requirements for a motion 
for a new trial, but the case at bar presents an additional 
element. The evidence here contains a procedural twist because a 
co-defendant, who was previously allowed only to make a two-
sentence statement, has since pleaded guilty to the crime at 
issue. At the time of the motion for a new trial, the 
co-defendant no longer desired Fifth Amendment protection. 
Hence, the new trial requirement of being "discoverable and 
produceable" is an issue which has not yet been addressed under 
facts like those in Mr. Massey's case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
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theft by receiving stolen property (Count I), a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408, and sale of a 
firearm to a juvenile (Count II), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-509.9. See (R 4-5; 39; 64-
65; 78-83). 
On or about October 31, 1994, the State filed the above 
charges against Casey Sanslow and Kip Massey. (R 4-5). Each 
case, however, was resolved separately. (R 132-427; 436-48) . 
On April 11, 1995, Mr. Massey requested a continuance of 
his trial date, after learning that Mr. Sanslow would enter a 
guilty plea to the same charge in six days. (R 26; 100). The 
lower court denied Mr. Massey's motion. (R 26; 101). 
On April 14, 1995, a jury convicted Mr. Massey of both 
of the above Counts. (R 64-65; 430-33). On April 17, 1995, 
Casey Sanslow pleaded guilty to the sale of a firearm to a 
juvenile Count, a conviction identical to the one contested in 
Kip Massey's trial. (R 5; 39; 437-45),x 
On June 5, 1995, the court sentenced Mr. Massey to an 
indeterminate prison term of one-to-fifteen years on Count I, and 
zero-to-five years on Count II. The court then suspended the 
imposition of both terms, which were imposed concurrently, and it 
instead placed him on probation for 24 months and ordered him to 
pay various fines and fees. (R 78-83; 458-59) . 
On June 14, 1995, Mr. Massey filed a motion for a new 
1
 Mr. Sanslow's other charge was dismissed pursuant to a plea 
bargain agreement. (R 437). 
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trial. (R 84-85). The court denied his motion on July 31, 1995. 
(R 84-85; 103-06; 461-68). Other procedural facts are more fully 
addressed below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about October 31, 1994, the State filed a criminal 
Information against two co-defendants, Kip Lane Massey and Casey 
L. Sanslow. (R 4-5). The charges filed against both defendants 
were identical. (R 4-5). 
The theft by receiving stolen property charge, Count I, 
and the sales of a firearm to a juvenile charge, Count II, both 
alleged that the offense occurred on or about June 21, 1994. (R 
4-5). The elements and allegations for both Counts were the same 
for each defendant. (R 4-5) . 
For both counts, the probable cause statement of the 
Information stated in pertinent part: 
Someone broke into the home of Terry Sanslow 
on June 19, 1994 and took a .22 cal. Dillinger 
pistol. 
On August 30, 1994 Defendant Casey Sanslow 
admitted to your affiant [Detective Deven 
Higgins] after Miranda that he sold the gun to 
Bryan and Grant Kirby. The Kirby brothers are 
thirteen and fifteen years old. 
Bryan and Grant Kirby told your affiant that 
the gun was actually purchased from Kip Massey 
on June 21, 1994. 
(R 5) . 
Even after Casey Sanslow had admitted that he was 
responsible for selling the firearm to a juvenile, (R 5, 296), 
the State still continued to prosecute both Casey and Kip for the 
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same offense, Count II. (R 132-427; 436-48). Although the 
Counts against the co-defendants remained the same, their cases 
were apparently separated in the bindover. (R 5, 461). As 
summarized in the probable cause statement, the seller of the 
firearm was either Casey or Kip--both persons could not have been 
the seller. (R 5). Kip Massey always maintained his innocence. 
(R 348-49; 371). 
Casey Sanslow's involvement in the case at bar is tied 
to the fact that his father owned the missing .22 caliber gun. 
Terry Sanslow suspected that the "someone" who broke into his 
home and stole the gun was his son, Casey. (R 202). Additional 
stolen property included electronic items, jewelry, and other 
firearms. (R 201). Terry resided in Price, Utah; Casey lived in 
Salt Lake City. (R 200, 202). 
An unrelated incident also led police to Casey. Officer 
Dukatz was on patrol on August 25, 1995, at around midnight, when 
he stopped and questioned two persons who appeared to be 
juveniles, 13 year old Greg Brian Kirby and 15 year old Grant 
Kirby. (R 264-67). The officer's search of Greg Brian Kirby 
produced a gun, a .22 caliber derringer pistol. (R 267). 
Following a check of the gun's serial numbers, the 
officers learned that the gun belonged to Terry Sanslow. (R 280-
81). Since Casey had been a suspect in the Price burglary, his 
name resurfaced after the gun was recovered. (R 285-86) . 
Casey denied committing the burglary, but he admitted 
that he had been in possession of the derringer pistol. (R 287) . 
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Casey also acknowledged that he had sold the gun to the Kirbys. 
(R 291, 296). 
By contrast, Grant Kirby claimed that he had bought the 
gun from Kip Massey. (R 269). According to Detective Higgins, 
even though Casey declared against his own interest that Kip had 
nothing to do with the gun, the detective still charged Kip 
because Grant's story had not changed. (R 296). 
The detective, however, did not know that Grant and 
Travis Kirby were selling stolen items (e.g. stereo equipment) to 
Mike Gillespie in exchange for marijuana. (R 341, 357). Grant 
accused Kip of selling the gun only after Kip had kicked Mike out 
of the house for dealing drugs. Mike and Kip were once 
roommates. (R 341, 352, 357-59). Grant's accusation also 
protected his 17 year old brother, Travis, from liability since 
Travis purchased the gun that police had found on Greg, another 
Kirby brother. (R 242, 267, 363); (R 208) (Grant's accusation 
shielded Travis from the firearm sale to a juvenile charge). 
Kip Massey's trial was scheduled for April 13, 1995. 
Prior to trial, however, Mr. Massey sought a continuance after 
learning that on April 17, 1995, Casey Sanslow would plead guilty 
to the same charge at issue (Count II) in Mr. Massey's trial. 
(R 5, 99, 441). Mr. Massey's motion was denied. (R 26). 
Casey Sanslow indicated that he would "take the Fifth 
Amendment" protection against self-incrimination if his testimony 
was required before the entry of his guilty plea. (R 99). Casey 
Sanslow did not testify at Mr. Massey's trial, although Casey's 
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two-sentence statement was offered in his absence without the 
benefit of an accompanying explanation: 
I, Casey Sanslow, had in my possession on 
June 21st a little .22 handgun which I sold to 
the Kirby twins for $35 with a gun case, and Kip 
Massey was not and had nothing to do with it. 
At the time I did know that it was a stolen gun. 
Signed: Casey Sanslow. 
8-30-1994. 
(R 296). 
The State attacked Casey Sanslow's statement, however, 
stressing repeatedly that it was Kip, not Casey, who had sold the 
gun to the Kirbys. (R 217, 246). The prosecution's closing 
argument summarized its contentions: 
And I [the State] asked both of these young 
boys, fifteen and seventeen years old [Grant and 
Travis Kirby], I said, "Are you sure? Are you 
sure the person that sold you this gun was this 
young man, Kip Massey?" 
And both of them said, "Yes." 
Said, "Are you sure it wasn't somebody else? It 
wasn't Casey Sanslow? It wasn't somebody else 
in the house?" 
And both of them said, "We're sure the person 
that sold us the gun was the defendant, Kip 
Massey." 
(R 400). 
The written statement by Casey Sanslow, who was at the 
time of trial unable and unwilling to testify on behalf of Kip, 
apparently lacked the force of in-person testimony. On Friday, 
April 14, 1995, the jury convicted Mr. Massey of "theft by 
receiving stolen property" (Count I) and "firearm sales to 
juvenile" (Count II). (R 64-65; 429-35). 
7 
On Monday, April 17, 1995, Casey Sanslow entered a 
guilty plea to the exact same "firearm sales to juvenile" Count, 
(R 5, 437), even though Casey could have used the State's own 
words in defense of his charge. Casey's plea was before a judge 
different from the one who had presided over Kip's trial. In 
another proceeding, Casey later admitted taking the .22 caliber 
derringer pistol from his father's home. (R 437). 
During Mr. Massey's sentencing proceeding, Casey Sanslow 
again repeated that Kip was not responsible: 
THE COURT: Did Mr. Massey know where those guns 
came from? 
MR. SANSLOW: No, he did not, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: How did you get them in the house, 
then? 
MR. SANSLOW: I was down fishing on a fishing 
trip with my father a week prior. That's when I 
took the gun. 
(R 457). 
On June 14, 1995, Mr. Massey filed a motion for a new 
trial. (R 84-85). In support of the motion, Mr. Massey filed 
Casey Sanslow's affidavit which stated in relevant part: 
1. I [Casey Sanslow] was charged in this case 
along with Kip Lane Massey. 
2. I hired Randy Ludlow to represent me. 
3. The weekend before this offense occurred, I 
was in Price, Utah, visiting my father, Terry 
Sanslow. 
4. While I was staying at my father's house, I 
took the 2.25 caliber Derringer pistol from his 
collection, and brought it to Salt Lake with me. 
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5. The following week, my mother told me that 
my father's home had been broken into and all 
his guns had been stolen. I was worried that I 
would be blamed for breaking into my father's 
house if I were found with the Derringer, so I 
decided to get rid of it. 
6. I went over to Kip Massey's house to meet 
with him and he wasn't home. I met someone on 
the porch by the name of Travis Kirby and asked 
him if he wanted to purchase the gun. I sold 
the gun to Mr. Kirby at that time for $30.00. 
7. Kip was not at home when I sold the gun to 
Travis Kirby. Kip did not see the gun, because 
I did not show it to him. 
8. Kip told me that a detective with the Murray 
Police was looking for me. I called him the 
same day and went into the police station. 
While I was there, I signed a statement telling 
the police that I sold the gun to the Kirby's 
and that Kip had nothing to do with it. 
9. I entered into a plea bargain with the 
District Attorney's Office to plead guilty to a 
third degree felony on this case, before Judge 
Tyrone E. Medley on April 17, 1995. 
10. I was subpoenaed to testify at Kip Massey's 
trial which was to begin on April 13, 1995. I 
was advised by my attorney, Randy Ludlow, to 
invoke my fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination if I were called to testify. 
11. I have since entered a plea on this case, 
have been sentenced and am now available to 
testify. 
(R 103-04) (attached in Addendum B). 
The State argued that Casey's eleven paragraph affidavit 
did not offer anything different than his two sentence statement. 
(R 465-66) . Mr. Massey disagreed, noting that because he was not 
present at the time of the sale, only Casey could have testified 
specifically about what had occurred with the Kirbys. (R 464) . 
The court denied Mr. Massey's motion for a new trial. (R 468) . 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred in not granting the motion for a 
new trial. Even with reasonable diligence, Mr. Kip Massey was 
unable legally to produce Mr. Casey Sanslow's testimony. 
Mr. Sanslow was protected by the Fifth Amendment, and the jury 
was deprived of the opportunity to hear a full explanation of the 
extent of his involvement. 
Mr. Massey first requested a continuance in order to 
secure Mr. Sanslow's testimony, but the court denied his request. 
As evidenced by his affidavit, Casey Sanslow7s testimony was not 
cumulative and it offered enlightenment on vital points contested 
at trial. Mr. Sanslow7s testimony was so important that it 
rendered probable a different result on retrial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DUE TO THE 
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF CASEY SANSLOW7S TESTIMONY 
In State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1988), the supreme 
court expounded upon the general rule for granting a new trial: 
While the granting or refusing of the motion 
lies in the sound discretion of the court, where 
there is a grave suspicion that justice may have 
miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment 
on a vital point which new evidence will 
apparently supply, and the other elements 
attendant on obtaining a new trial on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence are present, it 
would be an abuse of sound discretion not to 
grant the same. 
James, 819 P.2d at 800 n.41 (citations omitted). The "other 
elements attendant on obtaining a new trial" are "(1) [The 
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evidence] must be such as could not with reasonable diligence 
have been discoverable and produced at the trial; (2) it must not 
be merely cumulative; (3) it must be such as to render a 
different result probable on the retrial of the case." Id. at 
793 (footnote omitted). 
Steven Ray James initially had been convicted of killing 
his infant son. He then moved for a new trial, alleging, inter 
alia, that the testimony of State witness Ronald Peterson was 
perjured. Peterson earlier had been housed in the same jail cell 
as Mr. James and "Peterson testified at trial that he overheard 
defendant [James] confess to another prisoner, John Lippencott, 
that he killed his son." 819 P.2d at 787, 793. 
After the trial, inmate Kenneth Lisner came forward to 
say that Peterson had testified falsely. The trial court, 
however, was of the opinion that Mr. James "was not convicted on 
the testimony of Ronald Peterson. . . . The Court finds that the 
tests for newly discovered evidence relating to a new trial do 
not exist. Even if they did exist, . . . the outcome of this 
case would not have been any different whether Ron Peterson 
testified or not." James, 819 P.2d at 800 (Howe, Associate C.J., 
concurring and dissenting).2 
2
 As summarized in the dissenting opinion, the evidence 
relied upon by the trial judge included: 
(1) the bruises and falls sustained by the baby 
while in defendant's care; (2) the insensitivity 
shown to the baby by defendant; (3) defendant's 
anger when questioned by police and his urging [the 
mother] not to give them certain information; (4) 
his jealously of the baby; (5) his concern about the 
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Despite claims by the dissent that new evidence 
concerning the lack of credibility of a witness should not serve 
as the basis for a new trial, id., the four justice majority 
disagreed. The appellate court reversed and "ordered a new trial 
so that defendant can place before the jury evidence that [State 
witness, inmate Ronald] Peterson fabricated his testimony in 
order to receive better treatment from the State, . . . " James, 
819 P.2d at 799 (Zimmerman, J., joined by Stewart and Durham, 
J.J.); accord 819 P.2d at 793 (Hall, C.J.). 
Evidence of Peterson' perjury was not reasonably 
discoverable before Mr. James' trial. 
Peterson apparently spoke to Kenneth Lisner 
concerning his fabrications to the police about 
two weeks before trial. He then told Lisner 
that he would not go through with the lie at 
trial. Lisner only discovered that Peterson had 
in fact committed perjury by watching news 
accounts of the trial after Peterson had already 
testified. 
James, 819 P.2d at 794-95. Holding that the first requirement 
for a new trial was satisfied, the opinion explained that even 
with due diligence such information could not have been produced. 
Id. at 794 (unreasonable to expect defense to interview all 
inmates in contact with Peterson). 
expense of raising the baby; (6) the fact that he 
was the last person to be with the baby prior to the 
baby's disappearance; (7) his elaborate explanation 
for the baby's disappearance; and (8) the baby's 
body found wrapped in a mattress cover which 
belonged to defendant. 
James, 819 P.2d at 800 (Howe, Associate C.J., dissenting). 
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The evidence also was not cumulative, notwithstanding 
trial court's findings to the contrary. "The trial judge found 
that Lisner's testimony would be merely cumulative of James's 
testimony that he had never had a conversation with Lippencott." 
Id. It also found "that the testimony to be presented by Lisner 
went merely to the credibility of Peterson and did not present 
new evidence of defendant's innocence." Id. 
The high court rejected the lower court's 
interpretation, however, explaining that: 
the credibility evidence went beyond refuting 
the testimony of Peterson and established 
independent evidence that he had deliberately 
committed perjury in an attempt to subvert the 
trial process to his own ends. Lisner's 
testimony concerned a disputed fact that arose 
between Peterson's testimony and James's, 
whether or not Peterson's testimony concerning 
the overheard confession was truthful. 
James, 819 P.2d at 794. 
The third requirement, the likelihood of a different 
result, was similarly satisfied. The evidence, "while 
sufficient, [was] not overwhelming or compelling." Id.; cf. 
supra note 2. "Peterson's testimony went to the heart of the 
evidence against defendant." 819 P.2d at 795. Having determined 
that the criteria for a new trial were met, the James court held 
that "the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion based on evidence that Peterson testified 
falsely." id. 
The case at bar presents an analogous situation. In its 
order denying Mr. Massey's motion for a new trial, the trial 
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court opined: 
Given [the] fact that the Court allowed the 
confession in of the Co-defendant and [it] 
apparently is consistent with what you indicated 
his testimony would be, it gets to be an issue 
of credibility. The Court will deny the motion 
for a new trial. 
(R 468). 
While Mr. Massey does not dispute that Casey Sanslow's 
two sentence confession is "consistent" with what Casey's trial 
testimony would reveal, as indicated in James, a motion for a new 
trial may not be thwarted merely because evidence is believed to 
be "consistent" or because it addresses credibility. See James, 
819 P.2d at 793-95. Like the testimony of Kenneth Lisner in 
James, the testimony of Casey Sanslow in Mr. Massey's case 
constituted evidence which should not have been discounted. 
A. THE EVIDENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED 
AND PRODUCED AT MR. MASSEY'S TRIAL 
Mr. Massey conceded, and the State correctly noted that 
Casey Sanslow was available physically at the time of Kip's 
trial. (R 463, 465). There is a difference, however, between 
being available physically and being available legally. (R 463); 
see generally State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 402 (Utah 1994) . 
Even with due diligence, Kip Massey could not have 
legally "discovered and produced" Casey Sanslow for his testimony 
at Kip Massey's trial. Mr. Massey subpoenaed Casey Sanslow, 
except Casey was instructed by counsel to invoke his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination if called to testify. 
(R 17; 104; 188-89). Hence, although Kip Massey was indeed aware 
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of Casey Sanslow, Casey still could not have been compelled to 
"produce" testimony in person on behalf of Kip. U.S. Const, 
amend. V; Utah Const, art. I, §12. Such testimony could have 
been produced only after Casey had entered his guilty plea. (R 
104) . 
In addition, Mr. Massey had attempted to use other means 
to secure Casey Sanslow's testimony. Mr. Massey also had 
diligently requested a continuance of his trial, scheduled for 
April 13-14, 1995, in order to allow Casey Sanslow to enter his 
guilty plea on April 17, 1995. (R 99, 436-48). Even though such 
a short interval would have given Casey the opportunity to 
testify fully in the Massey proceeding, the lower court 
nevertheless rejected the continuance request. (R 101); cf. 
State v. Gehring, 694 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1984) (motion for a new 
trial viewed more favorably if defense had requested a 
continuance in order to allow a witness to be present). 
Mr. Massey's situation is more compelling than the James 
case. In James, while there may have been "difficulties 
inherent" in interviewing the 50-100 prisoners who were housed 
with Ronald Peterson, such a task was at least factually 
possible. 819 P.2d at 794. In Mr. Massey's case, however, even 
with the exercise of reasonable diligence, he could not legally 
produce Casey Sanslow, nor was Casey required to incriminate 
himself in person at Kip Massey7s trial. The first requirement 
for a new trial was met. 
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B. CASEY SANSLOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO 
PROVIDE IMPORTANT NON-CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE 
The State argued that "a new trial would [not] make any 
difference in this case because it's going to be essentially the 
same evidence. The evidence in his [Casey Sanslow's] Affidavit 
is essentially what the Jury heard in the trial that we did in 
this case." (R 465). Contending that "[t]he Defense has told 
the Court this is not newly discovered evidence [,]" the State 
claimed that Mr. Massey "knew about the Co-defendant [Casey 
Sanslow]". (R 465-66). 
Contrary to the State's arguments, knowing about Casey 
is distinct from compelling him to testify. As explained above, 
see supra Point I.A., the evidence was "new" because it could not 
have been used earlier, especially since Mr. Massey's request for 
a continuance had been denied. (R 101). 
The State also added, "They Jury was allowed to see the 
[two sentence] statement, the confession that was made by the Co-
defendant, Mr. [Casey] Sanslow, in which Mr. Sanslow takes full 
responsibility, claims that Mr. Massey had nothing to do with 
it." (R 464-65). 
Casey Sanslow's two sentence statement and his affidavit 
both acknowledged responsibility, but they were not cumulative of 
one another. Sanslow's brief statement said only: 
I, Casey Sanslow, had in my possession on 
June 21st a little .22 handgun which I sold to 
the Kirby twins for $35 with a gun case, and Kip 
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Massey was not and had nothing to do with it. 
At the time I did know that it was a stolen gun. 
Signed: Casey Sanslow. 
8-30-1994. 
(R 296). 
By comparison, Casey's affidavit additionally summarized 
how and when he took the gun, (R 103, 1 4) (his affidavit is 
contained in Addendum B); it explained why he wanted to get rid 
of the gun, (R 104, 1 5); it gave the specifics of what had 
happened and what was said, (R 104, 1 6); it revealed which Kirby 
brother actually purchased the gun, (R 104, 11 6-7); it indicated 
that Kip Massey was not at home at the time, nor was he ever 
shown the gun, (R 104, 1 7); and it outlined the aftermath of the 
incident, including the entry of his guilty plea to the firearm 
sales to a juvenile offense. (R 104, 11 8-11) . 
Not only did the words of the affidavit address for the 
first time matters which the jury did not consider, the jury also 
was precluded from assessing the in-person testimony of Casey 
Sanslow. "Evidence from a neutral third party is not merely 
cumulative of a criminal defendant's testimony. It is of a 
different kind and nature than defendant's statements, and it 
certainly could have a different quality in the eyes of the 
jurors who assess the credibility of the witnesses." James, 819 
P.2d at 794 (footnote omitted); see also id. ("The testimony of 
Lisner [or in the case at bar, Sanslow] would corroborate that of 
James [who was in the same position as Massey] and provide 
independent evidence of his version of the facts"). 
17 
"New" evidence also went beyond Casey's affidavit and 
his in-person ability to clarify and expound on his culpability; 
the new evidence additionally included Casey's recently entered 
guilty plea to the "firearm sales to a juvenile" charge, (R 104, 
1 9); the very same Count at issue in, and disputed by, Kip 
Massey in his trial. (R 5, 39, 437-43). A jury should have been 
able to consider the nature of Casey's admission, given its 
newness and the fact that it was formally entered even after Kip 
had been convicted of the same offense. See infra Point I.e. 
The second requirement was fulfilled. The evidence was not 
cumulative. 
C. THE IN-PERSON TESTIMONY OF CASEY SANSLOW 
RENDERED PROBABLE A DIFFERENT RESULT ON 
RETRIAL 
In contrast to its arguments at the hearing on the 
motion for a new trial, at Mr. Massey's trial the State's closing 
arguments suggested that Casey Sanslow's in-person testimony 
would have added far more to the case than what Casey's two 
sentence statement had left unanswered: 
[The State:] Notice how he [Casey Sanslow] 
identifies the gun. The only thing he calls it 
is a little .22 handgun. This is the statement 
from Casey Sanslow. Doesn't even refer to it as 
a Derringer. You got to wonder whether he's 
even talking about the same gun. I mean maybe 
they sold so many guns, they're starting to get 
confused over how many guns they sold and on 
which days. 
All he says is, "I, Casey Sanslow, had in my 
possession on June 21st a little .22 handgun, 
which I sold to the Kirby twins." 
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Gosh, got to even wonder if he knew who he 
sold it to. The Kirby twins? They're not 
twins. They're brothers. One's fifteen. One's 
seventeen. They don't look alike. You saw both 
of them yesterday. And yet here in the 
statement, he says, "I sold it to the Kirby 
twins." 
(R 408-09). 
Casey's in-person trial testimony would have addressed 
all of the State's questions, including the misidentification of 
the Kirbys --an error also committed by the State. (R 465) (the 
State referred incorrectly to the Kirbys as the "Travis 
brothers"). 
Kip Massey was the lone defense witness. (R 333-89) . 
Casey Sanslow would have done more than clarify his two sentence 
statement, Casey also offered the only other evidence in support 
of Kip Massey. (R 103-04). Casey was critical to countering the 
State's claim that the Kirby boys were not lying: 
[The State:] Now, it's interesting. The 
defendant in this case, Kip Massey, says to you 
[the jury], "Oh, no, no. It's not me. I never 
had anything to do with this gun. I wasn't in 
possession of the gun. I've never seen the gun. 
I didn't sell the gun to anyone." 
And so you have to say to yourself, "If 
that's true, are you telling us, Kip Massey, are 
you telling us that these two boys are lying, 
that Grant and Travis are lying here in a 
courtroom? They're not telling us the truth 
about the transaction? 
And he says, "Yeah, I guess they are." 
And the real question is: Why? Whv? Why 
would these two boys come in here, or why would 
they even tell law enforcement that this is the 
young man who made the sale to them if it's not 
the truth? 
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(R 402-03) (emphasis added). 
Without Casey Sanslow7s in-person testimony, Kip 
Massey7s denials proved unpersuasive. The jury simply accepted 
Grant and Travis7 story. 
Had Casey Sanslow been present, however, the juveniles7 
claims would have been viewed very differently. Instead of 
evidence which simply pitted Kip's word against the story by the 
two boys, the jury would have been able to hear and to see that 
Casey had no reason to lie. 
The inquiry would have broadened to "why would Casey 
Sanslow lie?" Casey and Kip were co-defendants charged with the 
exact same crimes. (R 5). Casey had every reason to blame Kip. 
Yet, before charges were ever filed, Casey admitted selling the 
gun. (R 5). Casey then continuously and consistently confessed 
his guilt. (R 5; 103-04; 296; 436-48; 457). 
Having already relied on the Fifth Amendment, Casey may 
have further protected himself by declining, on April 17, 1995, 
to enter his guilty plea. Casey may have instead pleaded 
innocent and defended himself with the April 14, 1995, Massey 
verdict and the State's own closing arguments.3 Casey Sanslow 
3
 As indicated previously in the Statement of Facts, the 
prosecution's argument singled out Kip, not Casey: 
And I [the State] asked both of these young boys, fifteen 
and seventeen years old [Grant and Travis Kirby], I said, 
"Are you sure? Are you sure the person that sold you this 
gun was this young man, Kip Massey?" 
And both of them said, "Yes." 
Said, "Are you sure it wasn't somebody else? It wasn't 
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did none of the above because he knew Kip was not responsible. 
(R 103-04, 296, 457) ,4 The jury never had the opportunity to 
consider that Casey's guilty plea to the crimes was a formal 
legal declaration which was consistent with his earlier informal 
confessions. 
The State's claim that Casey "took the fall" for Kip is 
of no consequence here. Instead of the typical scenario where a 
witness stands to gain something by testifying, see, e.g., James, 
819 P.2d at 793-94, the jury in the instant action was deprived 
of the opportunity to see that Casey's own admissions punished 
him.5 All the requirements for a new trial were met. The lower 
court erred in not granting Mr. Kip Massey's motion for a new 
trial. 
Casey Sanslow? It wasn't somebody else in the house?" 
And both of them said, "We're sure the person that sold us 
the gun was the defendant, Kip Massey." 
(R 400). 
4
 Even as of today, Casey Sanslow never had second thoughts 
about his guilty plea. Nothing in his name was docketed or filed 
for an appeal. 
5
 No evidence suggests that Casey's confession was part of 
a bargain, particularly since he repeatedly maintained his 
incriminating position both before and after the entry of his 
plea and the Massey verdict. Moreover, there is no possibility 
of defendant "A" avoiding a conviction by blaming defendant "B", 
and then "B" at his trial avoiding a conviction by blaming "A" . 
Kip and Casey did not help each other by using separate 
proceedings to point the finger at one another. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Massey respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
his convictions. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Art. I, § 12 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Amend. V CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbro-
kers. 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property 
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has 
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the 
case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a 
separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the 
receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed, 
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable 
value; or 
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or 
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or 
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains 
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the 
property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the 
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identifica-
tion. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in 
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every 
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to 
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have 
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or 
unlawfiilly obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence 
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a 
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal 
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or 
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the 
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then 
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought, 
received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as 
defined in Section 76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Receives* means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on 
the security of the property; 
(b) "Dealer* means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
76-10-509.9. Sales of firearms to juveniles. 
(1) A person may not sell any firearm to a minor under 18 years of age unless 
the minor is accompanied by a parent or guardian. 
(2) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third degree felony. 
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) 
: ss. 
) 
CASEY SANSLOW, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I was charged in this case along with Kip Lane Massey. 
2. I hired Randy Ludlow to represent me. 
3. The weekend before this offense occurred, I was in Price, Utah, visiting my father, 
Terry Sanslow. 
4. While I was staying at my father's house, I took the 2.25 caliber Derringer pistol 
from his collection, and brought it to Salt Lake with me. 
5. The following week, my mother told me that my father's home had been broken 
into and all his guns had been stolen. I was worried that I would be blamed for 
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breaking into my father's house if I were found with the Derringer, so I decided to get 
rid of it. 
6. I went over to Kip Massey's house to meet with him and he wasn't home. I met 
someone on the porch by the name of Travis Kirby and asked him if he wanted to 
purchase the gun. I sold the gun to Mr. Kirby at that time for $30.00. 
7. Kip was not at home when I sold the gun to Travis Kirby. Kip did not see the 
gun, because I did not show it to him. 
8. Kip told me that a detective with the Murray Police was looking for me. I called 
him the same day and went into the police station. While I was there, I signed a 
statement telling the police that I sold the gun to the Kirby's and that Kip had nothing 
to do with it. 
9. I entered into a plea bargain with the District Attorney's Office to plead guilty to 
a third degree felony on this case, before Judge Tyrone E. Medley on April 17, 
1995. 
10. I was subpoenaed to testify at Kip Massey's trial which was to begin on April 13, 
1995. I was advised by my attorney, Randy Ludlow, to invoke my fifth amendment 
right against self-incrimination if I were called to testify. 
11. I have since entered a plea on this case, have been sentenced and am now 
available to testify. 
DATED this ^ day of July, 1995. 
CASE^SANSLOW 
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Subscribed to and sworn to before me this^EL day of July, 1995. 
My Commission Expires 1M/ 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake District Attorney's 
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 this day of July, 1995. 
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